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Proportionality as Hidden (but Emerging?) 
Touchstone of American Federalism: 
Reflections on the Wayfair Decision 
Darien Shanske
INTRODUCTION
Until June 2018, a state could not require an out-of-state 
vendor to collect its use tax if the vendor did not have a physical 
presence in the state. This was the rule in place during the entire 
rise of the Internet and of e-vendors such as Amazon, which 
scrupulously avoided physical presence in as many states as 
possible. The result was a significant tax advantage for remote 
vendors as compared to brick and mortar stores, as well as 
increasing revenue losses for states and localities. It would be one 
thing if the national legislature had decided to confer this dubious 
tax advantage, yet this rule emerged not from Congress, but from 
the Supreme Court. 
In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,1 the Court overturned the 
physical presence requirement. In so doing the Court did more than 
just take away an unwise tax advantage that remote vendors did 
not secure through the political process. The Court also restored the 
ordinary constitutional balance in two related ways. First, the 
Court restored the states’ power to tax unless Congress has 
specifically preempted that power. To be sure, the Court has 
restricted the power of state taxation through application of the 
dormant Commerce Clause, but modern dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine is generally respectful of the background norm that states 
must be permitted the leeway to raise revenue as they see fit. 
Thus, and this is the second restoration, the Court corrected 
an anomalously formal pocket of dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence where it had crafted a bright-line rule that also 
had the effect of reversing the constitutional default in favor of 
state power. 
The exact impact of the Wayfair decision on the practice and 
reality of state and local public finance will take many years to 
 Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. 
1 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
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emerge. In this Article, I consider Wayfair in the context of the 
Court’s federalism jurisprudence. I argue that restoring the 
constitutional balance helps explain why the case came out as it did. 
Further, I place the Court’s approach to federalism in broader 
perspective, explaining that it illustrates an apt application of the 
proportionality principle. The proportionality principle is at the 
center of constitutional adjudication around the world and explicitly 
so. I demonstrate that this principle is no less powerful in 
adjudicating issues arising in our federal system, though typically 
under some other nominal analytic structure. 
I. HISTORY
First in 1967, and then in 1992, the Court had found that the 
federal Constitution required the physical presence rule to 
require an out-of-state vendor to collect use tax for that state.2
Even in 1967, this was a controversially formal and novel gloss 
on the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause.3
By 1992, due process jurisprudence had moved so far from formal 
tests that the physical presence rule seemed to have essentially 
been overturned, and the North Dakota Supreme Court asserted 
as much.4 Getting ahead of the Supreme Court clearly piqued 
some members of the Court, though there was unanimous 
agreement that, in fact, the North Dakota Supreme Court was 
correct as to the Due Process Clause.5 And thus in 1992, in Quill,
the Court made it clear that the physical presence rule was not 
required by the Due Process Clause.6 Rather, and distinguishing 
the two clauses in this way for the first time, the Court 
re-affirmed the physical presence rule, but only as emerging from 
the dormant Commerce Clause.7
Shifting the source of the rule had the seemingly momentous 
implication that Congress could change the rule if it so chose.8
Yet over the ensuing twenty-five years Congress did not, though 
there were numerous proposals to do so. One way of analyzing 
2 See generally Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 
(1967); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota 
v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
3 See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. See the powerful dissent written by Justice 
Fortas on behalf of three Justices. Id. at 760 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
4 See State ex rel Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991). 
5 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. 
6 See id. at 305. Interestingly, it is now the Court’s due process jurisprudence that 
leading commentators see as “thinly reasoned,” especially in light of Wayfair. See Allan 
Erbsen, Wayfair Undermines Nicastro: The Constitutional Connection Between State 
Tax Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J.F. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3291858. 
7 See id.
8 See id. at 318.  
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the situation is that Congress was content with the result, 
perhaps happy that this rule was shielding an infant industry. 
Alternatively, there is an argument that Congress might have 
considered overturning Quill if only the states had acted to 
simplify their sales and use tax systems sufficiently.9
A counter-narrative argues that Congress, especially the 
modern Congress, is designed not to act and that the states simply 
could not get quite enough momentum on their side given the 
determined opposition of remote vendors, states without sales 
taxes and anti-tax activists.10 As an empirical matter, Congress 
seems most likely to act in the interstate context in response to 
narrow concentrated interests, a finding generally consistent with 
public choice theory.11 From this perspective, it would be more 
likely that Congress would act to shield specific business interests 
from the statesshould the Quill rule be removed. We will now 
have the opportunity to see if this is true, assuming the states 
overreach somehow. 
Given the magnitude of the revenue loss and competitive 
harm they faced, the states became increasingly creative in 
asserting nexus even under Quill.12 At the same time, major 
players, such as Amazon, now found it in their business interest 
to establish a physical presence in multiple states.13 Thus, by 
2018, the major harm to the states had, to some extent, been 
mitigated. This situation too could be seen in two ways. On the 
one hand, one might argue that whatever harm the Quill rule 
had done, it was no longer a pressing problem. On the other 
hand, one might argue that the Quill rule—ostensibly meant to 
help preserve a uniform market—launched dozens of competing 
state initiatives to collect the use tax, with more to come as the 
online market continued to grow in importance. 
II. DECISION
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy argued that the 
Quill rule was always wrong, and it was not the Court’s place to 
9 This argument was made by the Respondents in Wayfair. See Respondents’ Brief 
at 13–17, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494).  
10 I made this argument with a co-author in an amicus brief. See Amicus Curiae 
Brief of Four U.S. Senators in Support of Petitioner at 20–24, South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494). 
11 See Brian Galle, Congressional Control of State Taxation: Evidence and Lessons 
for Federalism Theory, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM 1, 3 (Jonathan Klick 
ed., 2017). 
12 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–16, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 
298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 01-194). 
13 See Amazon’s Physical Presence (Nexus) in States and the Sales Tax Battle, AM.
INDEP. BUS. ALLIANCE (Sep. 27, 2016), https://www.amiba.net/amazon-nexus-subsidiaries/ 
[http://perma.cc/B3VM-C6M6]. 
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set down an incorrect rule and then wait for Congress to fix it.14
Going forward, as a matter of doctrine, the majority held that use 
tax collection obligations can only be imposed if they satisfy three 
tests. First, the use tax collection obligation must satisfy due 
process.15 This was already true in Quill.16 Second, the use tax 
collection obligation must satisfy the substantial nexus prong of 
the Complete Auto test.17 This prong no longer requires physical 
presence and we know that the South Dakota statute at issue 
satisfies this test.  
A state use tax collection requirement must also pass Pike
balancing. This issue was remanded to the South Dakota courts 
to consider, though the Court strongly suggested that the South 
Dakota statute would survive, explaining that:  
First, the Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited 
business in South Dakota. Second, the Act ensures that no obligation 
to remit the sales tax may be applied retroactively. S.B. 106, § 5. 
Third, South Dakota is one of more than [twenty] States that have 
adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. This system 
standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and compliance costs: It 
requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of 
products and services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform 
rules. It also provides sellers access to sales tax administration software 
paid for by the State. Sellers who choose to use such software are 
immune from audit liability.18
III. THE RISE OF PIKE BALANCING
In hindsight, the application of Pike balancing seems obvious. 
After all, we all learn in Constitutional Law I that this is the test we 
apply to a facially neutral law that arguably nevertheless imposes 
too great a burden on interstate commerce. Surely this was the 
heart of the claim made by remote vendors who have constantly 
reminded the Court of how many thousands of different sales tax 
jurisdictions there are in this country.  
14 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096–97 (2018). 
15 See id. at 2093. 
16 See id.
17 See id. at 2099 (“[T]he nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and 
virtual contacts [R]espondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that 
deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or 
more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an 
annual basis. S.B. 106, § 1. This quantity of business could not have occurred unless the 
seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota. 
And [R]espondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive 
virtual presence.”). 
18 Id. at 2099–100. 
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Nevertheless, Pike’s starring role is surprising. Justice Scalia’s 
disdain for Pike balancing is well-known,19 and a great deal of 
academic commentary supported his basic point that a balancing 
test is inherently uncertain, policy-driven, and legislative.20 The 
Court had not struck down a statute using Pike balancing since the 
1980s21 and the consensus seemed to be that the Court would not do 
so in Wayfair.
This was especially true because the Court seemed to use 
two different rubrics for analyzing taxes versus regulations.22
Taxes were subjected to the Complete Auto test,23 which does not 
include Pike balancing. However, regulations were subjected to 
the usual two levels of test: First facial discrimination analysis, 
second Pike balancing. 
As evidence of the no-Pike consensus, consider that the 
Petitioner in Wayfair—South Dakotadid not raise Pike as an 
alternative test in its petition for certiorari nor in its merit 
brief. The argument first appears in an amicus brief at the 
certiorari stage24 and then in several other amicus briefs, 
including, notably, that of the Solicitor General.25 The 
Respondents, predictably, dismissed Pike in their merits brief 
as “fundamentally unworkable.”26
Yet Pike arose immediately in oral argumentat the top of 
page four of the transcriptduring Justice Sotomayor’s opening 
questions.27 Note that Justice Sotomayor seemed to be of the 
opinionas was the amici who first emphasized Pikethat Pike
19 See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 360 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). Justice Gorsuch is clearly not a fan either. See, e.g., Energy & Env’t Legal 
Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015). 
20 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 453–58 (2008) (listing common critiques). 
21 BRANNON P. DENNING, BITKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE 6–33 (2d ed. 2013). 
22 Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the 
State-Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV.
541, 599 (2010); Edward A. Zelinsky, The False Modesty of Department of Revenue 
v. Davis: Disrupting the Dormant Commerce Clause Through the Traditional Public 
Function Doctrine, 29 VA. TAX REV. 407, 441 (2010). 
23 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
24 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Four U.S. Senators in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 10, at 3.  
25 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1168802; see also
Brief of Brill et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 
138 S. Ct. 2080 (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1203457. 
26 Respondents’ Brief at 57, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (No. 
17-494), 2018 WL 1621148. 
27 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 
2080 (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 2446095. 
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should be used instead of Complete Auto.28 In Wayfair, the Court 
chose to engage in both the Complete Auto and Pike analyses.29
IV. PROPORTIONALITY AS UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM
As a matter of constitutional theory, the proportionality 
principle is the dominant mode around the world for adjudicating 
claims where there are strong rights-based arguments on both 
sides.30 The typical context in which the principle applies occurs 
when the rights of an individual, say to privacy or due process, 
clash with the right of the collective, say to freedom from harm.31
The proportionality principle permits an abridging of individual 
rights, but only if the collective need is sufficiently important and 
only to the extent necessary to satisfy that need. 
In the context of horizontal federalism, there is also a clash of 
rights.32 Indeed, Justice Kennedy, in summarizing dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine, explains that its purpose is “to 
accommodate the necessary balance between state and federal 
power.”33 Put in the language of rights, there is the right of 
subnational governments, here states, to regulate as their citizens 
think best. But there is also a right of the collective nation not to be 
overburdened by particular state regulations, as well as the rights 
of individuals (and businesses) in other states not to be subjected to 
“foreign” regulations, let alone burdensome ones. As in the case of 
individual rights, application of the proportionality principle in 
borderline cases is apt. Pike balancing applies this principle, as does 
the very similar search for sufficiently “substantial nexus.”34 It is 
the primary contention of this Article that, however implicit and 
necessarily messy, the use of proportionality analysis is correct. 
28 See id.
29 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2092–93, 2099 (2018). 
30 See, e.g., Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere 
but Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2012) (explaining and comparing balancing 
and proportionality). 
31 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 89 (2008); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation 
on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 626 (1999).  
32 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 623–34. Jackson’s analysis focuses on the City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), decision, discussed briefly below. 
33 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090. 
34 Adam Thimmesch argues, and I agree, that the substantial nexus prong is 
essentially the same as Pike balancing. Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach to 
Nexus Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 106 (2018). 
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V. PROPORTIONALITY IS IN: EXTRATERRITORIALITY IS OUT (AND 
RIGHTLY SO)35
Towards the end of the briefing in Wayfair, a doctrine credibly 
reported as dead36 made a determined attempt to return from the 
grave. This doctrine is called the extraterritoriality doctrine, 
dubbed by then-Judge Gorsuch as “most dormant.”37 At the 
margins, this doctrine is unassailable. California cannot impose a 
regulation on farms in Missouri. It would seem like such a law 
would fail under any number of constitutional provisions, 
including not only the Due Process Clause but also the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
On the other hand, California can clearly regulate the food 
that is sold in California. The effect of those consumer regulations 
might well be felt by farmers in Missouri. Does such a regulation 
have a forbidden extraterritorial effect? The answer based on 
standard dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence would be to 
apply Pike balancing. If the California regulation imposed a 
burden on interstate commerce out of all proportion to the benefit 
it provides, it would fail.  
Yet there is also the extraterritoriality doctrine, which, 
according to one formulation, requires a court to determine 
“whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control 
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”38 Such a test would 
strike down hundreds of state laws,39 including presumably use 
tax collection laws which, of course, are directed at out-of-state 
vendors. A strong appeal to the extraterritoriality doctrine was 
made by Paul Clement, a former Solicitor General.40
35 Note that this section draws from a White Paper on the dormant Commerce 
Clause that was co-written with Anna Zaret. See generally ANNA ZARET & DARIEN
SHANSKE, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH POL’Y, THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: WHAT
IMPACT DOES IT HAVE ON THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL COSTS? (2017). 
36 See Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A 
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 1106 (2013). 
37 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015). Note 
that Justice Gorsuch refers to this decision in his concurrence in Wayfair, as an example 
of his thinking about the dormant Commerce Clause. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct at 2100–01 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
38 Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
39 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 808 (2001); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and 
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1486 (2007); Denning, supra note 36, at 1000. 
40 See Brief for Amici Curiae Nat’l Taxpayers Union Found. et al., in Support of 
Respondents, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 
1709085, at *6. Clement likely knew that the extraterritoriality argument was made in 
Pharma v. Walsh on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce by none other than John 
Roberts, now the Chief Justice. See Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. 
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) (No. 01-188), 2002 WL 31120077, at *15. It is thus all the 
more striking that the argument got no traction at all in Wayfair.
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The Court first invalidated a state law for violating the 
prohibition on extraterritoriality in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig.41 That 
case involved a New York state law that banned the sale of milk 
produced out-of-state unless the seller paid a minimum price set by 
New York when she purchased the milk out-of-state.42 The 
unanimous decision said that New York improperly “project[ed] its 
legislation” beyond its boundaries by dictating the terms of 
transactions that took place in other states.43 The most recent 
application of the doctrine was in Healy v. The Beer Institute, where 
the Court struck down a Connecticut law that required out-of-state 
beer distributors to affirm that their prices in Connecticut “were 
and would remain no higher than the lowest prices they would 
charge for each beer product in the border [s]tates.”44
It was in Healy where the Court made the sweeping 
statement that the inquiry is whether “the practical effect of the 
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the 
State.”45 Since Healy, the Court has not applied the doctrine and, 
indeed, the doctrine has been criticized because of its potentially 
vast sweep—sweep inconsistent with federalism values. This point 
was made in a leading law review article in 2001, and both the 
Supreme Court and lower courts seem to have taken its lesson to 
heart by allowing the doctrine to become most dormant.46
The leading non-application of the doctrine occurred in 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh 
in 2003.47 In that case, Maine enacted a program that encouraged 
drug manufacturers to enter into rebate agreements with the 
state.48 The rebate agreements allowed Maine to provide residents 
with drugs at discounted prices.49 To get drug manufacturers to 
enter the agreements, the state decided to impose Medicaid “prior 
authorization” procedures on the products of any manufacturer that 
refused to join the program.50 The prior authorization procedures 
generally made the drug less likely to be prescribed and ultimately 
sold to Medicaid patients. Thus, the state threatened to reduce 
41 294 U.S. 511, 519 (1935). 
42 Id.
43 Id. at 521. 
44 491 U.S. 324, 327 (1989). 
45 Id. at 336.  
46 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 39, at 789–90. For the history and similar analysis, 
see Denning, supra note 36, at 979. The Goldsmith & Sykes article was cited to in the briefing 
in Walsh. Brief of the Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (No. 01-188), 2002 WL 
31506948, at *23.  
47 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003). 
48 Id. at 651. 
49 Id. at 653–54. 
50 Id. at 655. 
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manufacturer’s market share and sales unless it joined the 
program.51 The drug manufacturers argued that the law 
impermissibly regulated out-of-state commerce because it had 
the inevitable effect of controlling the terms of out-of-state sales 
between manufacturers and wholesale distributors.52 Maine 
argued that the only extraterritorial effect of the law was that it 
potentially impacted price negotiations between those two parties 
by reducing the manufacturer’s revenue.  
The Court unanimously agreed that there was no dormant 
Commerce Clause violation because the Maine law did not 
regulate out-of-state transactions, either “by its express terms or 
its inevitable effect,” echoing the conclusion of the First Circuit.53
Accordingly—as Professor Brandon P. Denning wrote in an article 
reviewing the rise and fall of the extraterritoriality doctrine—in 
the modern era extraterritoriality is “for all intents and purposes, 
dead.”54 However, and returning to where we started, a state that 
expressly regulates out-of-state conduct directly is a problem. But 
that is not the kind of law that is typically at issue. For example, 
the use tax collection laws regulate how an out-of-state vendor 
must conduct its in-state sales. 
Therefore, the extraterritoriality doctrine is not even necessary. 
The problem with the linking laws struck down in the leading 
extraterritoriality cases can be explained using Pike balancing.55
The problem with linking is that it imposes a significant burden on 
interstate business, and for little gain. Indeed, the burden could be 
impossible if every state regulated prices based on every other 
state’s prices. 
It is dangerous to draw conclusions from the dog that did not 
bark of course. Still, it is striking that the formaland most 
definitely non-balancingtest of extraterritoriality got no traction, 
even as Pike took center stage. 
51 Id. at 656. 
52 Id.
53 Id. at 645.  
54 Denning, supra note 36, at 1006. 
55 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015). Indeed, 
then-Judge Gorsuch and Judge Sutton argued that the extraterritoriality cases also could 
have been decided on the basis of illicit discrimination. See also Am. Beverage Assoc. 
v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 381 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (arguing that all 
cases that apply extraterritoriality to strike down a state law, involved dormant 
Commerce Clause protectionism concerns).
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VI. PROPORTIONALITY AS UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF VERTICAL
FEDERALISM
It is worth noting here that the recent leading case on vertical
federalism (NFIB v. Sebelius) also relies on the proportionality 
principle. In this area, the question is how to balance the 
legitimate desire of the central government to advance national 
goals with the ability of the states to choose other goals. The rule 
here seems to be that the federal government can do quite a lot to 
encourage states, but not too much. Consider the details of the 
Court’s ruling on the Medicaid expansion in NFIB v. Sebelius—the 
first Obamacare decision.56 The Court made it clear that the 
federal government can spendand not spendin order to cajole 
the states to cooperate with it. But the federal government cannot 
go too far and coerce the states by taking away a major source of 
funding on which they had come to rely.57
And proportionality plays an explicit role in another key 
vertical federalism decision, City of Boerne v. Flores.58 There the 
question is how far Congress’s power extends under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.59 Clearly Congress’s enforcement 
power must extend to protect the rights granted by the 
Amendment and, yet, those rights are broad and if Congress’s 
enforcement power were also broad, then that would give 
Congress an enormous amount of power to preempt state law. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, resolved the 
conflict between the need of the central government to enforce 
national law and that of the states to retain their powers to 
regulate by crafting a proportionality test: “There must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”60
VII. ANOTHER QUIET DOG: MURPHY V. NCAA
In Murphy v. NCAA,61 a decision authored by Justice Alito, 
and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch, the Court struck down a federal law 
that made it unlawful for states or their subdivisions to authorize 
betting on sporting events.62 The majority thought that this 
56 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
57 For further analysis, see Darien Shanske & David Gamage, The Federal 
Government’s Power to Restrict State Taxation, 81 ST. TAX NOTES 547, 550 (2016). 
58 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997). 
59 Id. at 516–17. 
60 Id. at 520. 
61 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
62 Id. at 1468. 
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decision followed from the anti-commandeering principle, namely 
that “Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures.”63
Daniel Hemel has made the strong case that this dicta 
throws into doubt the many statutes in which Congress tells the 
states that they may not tax a given transaction or party.64 After 
all, in those statutes, Congress is telling state legislatures what 
they cannot do, and as to a matter inherent to their sovereignty, 
namely how to raise revenue. 
Many commentators replied to Hemel that this cannot be what 
Murphy means, offering various arguments as to how the Court 
(and in the meantime courts) can follow Murphy but not take it so 
far.65 Even the Court does not seem to think that Murphy implies 
that Congress cannot preempt state tax legislation, since all nine 
Justices in Wayfair seemed to believe that Congress can (and 
should) provide uniform ground rules in this area.66 The structure 
of such a statute must, out of necessity, forbid state legislatures 
from passing certain kinds of tax laws. 
But what is the underlying reason that Murphy should not 
be read in this way? Put another way, I think there are ways to 
distinguish Murphy, but why should we do so? Or rather, why 
did it seem obvious to the Justices in Wayfair that Congress can 
preempt state taxing power in connection with the use tax no 
matter the implication of the dicta in Murphy? Again, I would 
argue that it is because the proportionality principle is the proper 
way to adjudicate clashes of broad constitutional principles.67 Of 
course, the national government must be able to exert some 
control over state taxing power, but that control cannot go too 
far, or it would undermine the ability of the states to operate 
as sovereigns.  
The restriction on state legislative power struck down in 
Murphy, on this reading, is better understood as the federal 
government going too far rather than failing a formal test as to 
who it is commandeering.68 Consider how Justice Alito chooses to 
63 Id. at 1478. 
64 Daniel Hemel, More on Murphy—and a Response to Critics, MEDIUM (May 16, 
2016), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/more-on-murphy-and-a-response-
to-critics-471b35c75ecb [http://perma.cc/7YKF-6SZ5]. 
65 See, e.g., Rick Hills, Murphy v. NCAA’s Escape from Baseline Hell, PRAWFSBLAWG
(May 16, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/murphy-v-
ncaas-escape-from-baseline-hell.html [http://perma.cc/LYS5-8M99].  
66 See generally South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
67 Brian Galle, for instance, makes a similar argument. See Brian Galle, Murphy’s 
(Misguided) Law, MEDIUM (May 15, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/ 
murphys-misguided-law-8c22889918e4 [http://perma.cc/9XMD-X75N]. 
68 Obviously, as to Murphy, this requires reading the opinion against itself. See
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485. 
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develop the facts underlying the case; he starts with: “Americans 
have never been of one mind about gambling, and attitudes have 
swung back and forth.”69 The federal government has thus taken 
a position on a controversial topic on which there is considerable 
disagreement and on which there seems to be little imperative 
for a national solution. 
VIII. WAYFAIR ITSELF AS A BALANCING DECISION
Wayfair was decided 5-4.70 One might assume that the four 
dissenters thought that the Quill rule should be upheld because 
Quill itself (and Bellas Hess) was correctly decided. For instance, 
the Quill rule does arguably provide certainty. Yet, in the end, 
not a single Justice would stand up for the rule of Quill; but then 
why was this a 5-4 decision? 
The four dissenters argued that stare decisis should protect 
the Quill rule—even though it was always a mistake—because it 
is an old rule that Congress can change.71 I take the key part of 
the majority response to be the following: 
While it can be conceded that Congress has the authority to change 
the physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the constitutional 
default rule. It is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to ask 
Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own 
creation. Courts have acted as the front line of review in this limited 
sphere; and hence it is important that their principles be accurate and 
logical, whether or not Congress can or will act in response. It is 
currently the Court, and not Congress, that is limiting the lawful 
prerogatives of the States.72
Put another way, Justice Kennedy is arguing that federalism 
values establish a pro-state power default and that it is untenable 
for a federal court, as a court, to erect a barrier to state power 
based on a mistake. 
But note that the dissent’s ode to stare decisis was written by 
Chief Justice Roberts,73 who, in another context wrote: “The 
dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal 
courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local 
government to undertake . . . .”74 The issue in that case, United 
Haulers Ass’n., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
was whether a public utility could force local users to use its waste 
69 Id. at 1468. 
70 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2018). 
71 Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
72 Id. at 2096–97. 
73 Id. at 2102. 
74 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 343 (2007). 
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treatment services, and Chief Justice Roberts held for the majority 
that it could.75 Justice Alito wrote a powerful dissent in this case 
and was joined by Justice Kennedy.76 Justice Alito again joined 
Justice Kennedy in Wayfair.77 Thus, according to Justices Alito 
and Kennedy, a pro-state constitutional default does not protect 
local flow control ordinances, but does protect the ability of states 
to impose a use tax collection obligation. Note that one cannot 
distinguish Wayfair from United Haulers because of stare decisis, 
as in both cases there was a precedent on point that had to be 
overturned in fact (or de facto, as in United Haulers). 
How do we think through this tangle? Through how the 
Justices weighed the facts. Consider Chief Justice Roberts. In 
United Haulers, Chief Justice Roberts began his decision explaining 
why waste treatment was a significant and intractable problem of 
the sort that he clearly thought it appropriate for local governments 
to solve.78 By contrast, in Wayfair, Chief Justice Roberts 
emphasized that the problem of use tax collection had apparently 
been largely solved and so there was no reason to destabilize 
matters by changing a flawed rule, especially a rule that Congress 
could change.79
For Justice Alito in United Haulers (and Justice Kennedy who 
signed onto his dissent), opening the door for local governments to 
force residents to use their services was sure to lead to wave after 
wave of local protectionist strictures.80 For Justice Kennedy in 
Wayfair (and Justice Alito who signed on to his majority opinion),81
the states’ struggle to mitigate an incorrect rule while waiting for 
Congress to act, was itself a significant harm. Justice Kennedy also 
did not agree that the Quill problem had been largely solved. 
IX. CONCLUSION: DON’T FEAR THE SCALES
As it turns out, I think Chief Justice Roberts was correct in 
United Haulers and that Justices Kennedy and Alito were 
correct in Wayfair. What should one make of this dissensus? 
Does it not indicate that there is no underlying principle, just 
75 See id. at 347.  
76 See id. at 355 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
77 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.  
78 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334. 
79 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2103 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“States and local 
governments are already able to collect approximately [eighty] percent of the tax revenue 
that would be available if there were no physical-presence rule.”). 
80 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Experience in other 
countries, where state ownership is more common than it is in this country, teaches that 
governments often discriminate in favor of state-owned businesses (by shielding them 
from international competition) precisely for the purpose of protecting those who derive 
economic benefits from those businesses, including their employees.”).  
81 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.  
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legislative judgments? Or, if there is a principle, don’t the 
different results indicate that the principle is failing to produce 
the kind of predictable results required by the rule of law? 
These are big questions, and oft-debated ones. I think 
considering our little universe of dormant Commerce Clause 
cases illustrates why one might beand I amsatisfied with 
these somewhat unsettled results. 
When the Justices engage in proportionality analysis, they are 
weighing substantial principles that are in conflict. The resulting 
balance between principles is itself a kind of principle. That is, 
once a certain judicial balance is chosen, it applies to all states, not 
just favored ones. All states can impose a use tax collection 
obligation if they follow South Dakota’s lead. All localities can 
impose a flow control ordinance directing residents to use a 
publicly-owned facility. 
This is not like ordinary legislative balancing. A government 
needs to set a tax rate or a set of tax rates, and, though this is also 
an inexact science, it does not necessarily involve a clash of 
principles. No one has a rights-based claim to be in a particular 
tax bracket in the abstract. Tax rates reflect a balance of 
considerations, but typically not a balance of rights of constitutional 
dimension. Further, once the rates are set, the government can give 
outand does give outtax breaks reducing the taxes of some for 
narrow policy reasons, even if the reasons are daft (and are truly 
just political giveaways).  
Though proportionality judgments are not merely legislative 
judgments, the final balancing as to constitutional principles will 
change with time, and with Justices. Is there not something 
incongruous about the Court returning to the fray again and 
again, often with fractured opinions, in order to achieve balance? 
Not if one recognizes that the balancing is itself a requirement 
because of the import of the competing imperatives being 
considered. Adopting a formal rule is ultimately to discount the 
principle on one side, as the Quill rule did violence to the 
interests of the states. 
Since the balancing must itself be a product of judgment, we 
assess its quality except on the basis of how the balancing is 
actually done. To some extent, we do not yet know the answer, as 
many post-Wayfair “balancings” await the courts. That said, in 
upholding the quite reasonable South Dakota statute, the Court 
has gotten us off to a promising start.82
82 Hayes Holderness, Navigating 21st Century Tax Jurisdiction (Jan. 11, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314272. 
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Even if appropriate for the Court to engage in this kind of 
balancing in the abstract, what about the weak textual warrant 
for our courts doing so? The textual warrant of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is another huge question but note that 
fact-intensive inquiries analogous to Pike balancing are a feature 
of international trade lawthat is to agreements that nations 
have explicitly negotiated among themselves.83 This makes 
sense. Parties to a free trade agreement reasonably desire a 
backup test should facially non-discriminatory local laws cause a 
discriminatory effect. Thus, Congress has already acceded to 
balancing rules in the context of facilitating an international free 
trade zone. If Congress passed a law about interstate commerce, 
it would presumably use a similar rubric to police the domestic 
free trade zone.84 It would then be up to the Supreme Court to 
apply that statute and that application would look pretty much 
exactly like current dormant Commerce Clause cases. The 
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was thus once 
prescient and remains necessary. As the Quill saga 
demonstrates, throwing matters back to Congress is a fraught 
enterprise, even when there is broad consensus as to what should 
be done. We are stuck with the dormant Commerce Clause. 
In sum, Wayfair holds that the states may impose a use tax 
collection obligation on remote vendors, but not if the burden 
placed upon them is too great because such a burden undermines 
the national marketplace.85 How much is too much will be 
decided via a common law process and that is, I contend, just how 
it should be and must be. The only problem with the current 
state of affairs is that the operative analytic principle, namely 
the proportionality principle, has not been embraced as such by 
the Court. Given its cosmopolitan provenance, it seems unlikely 
that such an explicit embrace will come anytime soon. 
83 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory 
State: A GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1421 
(1994) (“As is true of DCC doctrine, the GATT law also deals with facially neutral 
measures that disadvantage foreign firms compared with domestic ones.”). 
84 Indeed, Congress does use the “unreasonable burden” test in narrow interstate 
contexts. See 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d) (2018). 
85 See supra Part II. 
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